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I. INTRODUCTION
In the December 1998 issue, the Federal Communications Law Jour-
nal published a law review article surveying the Federal Communication
Commission's (FCC or Commission) international policy initiatives be-
tween 1985 and 1998.1 As that article explained, one of the centerpieces of
the FCC's international policies was its Benchmarks Order, in which the
FCC unilaterally imposed maximum benchmarks on the amount U.S. car-
riers may pay their foreign correspondents to hand off U.S.-originated In-
ternational Message Telecommunications Service (IMTS) traffic.2 As that
law review article further argued, the FCC's actions raised serious ques-
tions from both a legal and overall policy perspective.
Less than one month after the Federal Communications Law Journal
published that article, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Cable
& Wireless v. FCC (C&W)-to the unbridled giddiness of the FCC and to
the dismay of various parties representing over 100 foreign governments,
regulators, and telecommunications companies3-upheld the FCC's
Benchmarks Order in its "entirety. ' 4 In doing so, the D.C. Circuit has not
only placed major areas of previously settled case law in flux, but--even
assuming arguendo the court ruled correctly-also has approved nakedly
the FCC's role of "cartel manager" and destroyed what little chance there
was to avoid an all-out international telecommunications trade war.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION
In upholding the Commission's Benchmarks Order, the C&W court's
arguments essentially fell into two broad categories: In the first category,
the court concluded that the Commission reasonably exercised its rate-
making authority under the Communications Act 5 In support of this deci-
sion, the court held that: (a) the FCC had sufficient jurisdiction under the
Communications Act to impose settlement rate benchmarks; (b) the Com-
1. Lawrence J. Spiwak, From International Competitive Cartier to the WTO: A Sur-
vey of the FCC's International Telecommunications Policy Initiatives 1985-1998, 51 FED.
COMM. L.J. 111 (1998) [hereinafter Spiwak, Survey].
2. International Settlement Rates, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,806, 9 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1 (1997) [hereinafter Benchmarks Order].
3. Statement of FCC Chairman William E. Kennard on Today's Court Decision Up-
holding the FCC's Benchmarks Order, Jan. 12, 1999 (visited Feb. 15, 1999)
<http:llwww.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/stwek902.html>; cf. Heather Fleming,
C&W Loses Battle for Higher U.S. Interconnect Rates, BLOOMBERG NEws, Jan. 13, 1999,
available at <http://www.totaltele.com>.
4. Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, No. 97-1612 et al., 1999 WL 7824, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 12, 1999).
5. Id.
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mission had adequately demonstrated its use of the Tariff Components
Rate methodology; and (c) the FCC's actions were a legitimate exercise of
its authority under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. As demonstrated below,
however, the court was only able to reach this conclusion by ignoring well-
settled ratemaking jurisprudence.
In the second category, the court apparently concluded that if the po-
litical stakes are high enough, mercantile trade concerns can trump legal
precedent, economic theory, and the factual record itself. To wit, the court
both upheld the FCC's argument that benchmarks were necessary to pro-
tect U.S. firms against ephemeral price squeeze behavior by foreign firms
and found that-international comity aside-the FCC's actions in toto did
not violate international law.7 Indeed, in finding that the Commission's ac-
tions "to strengthen the bargaining position of domestic telecommunica-
tions companies in negotiations with their foreign counterparts"8 were a
legitimate exercise of the FCC's "public interest" authority, the court vio-
lated the heretofore golden rule that the "Commission is not at liberty...
to subordinate the public interest to the interest of 'equalizing competition
among competitors.' 9 Each category is discussed more fully below.
A. The Demise of Ratemaking Law
1. Jurisdictional Issues
The court held that there were essentially three reasons why the FCC
could assert jurisdiction to impose settlement rate benchmarks. First, the
court held that the FCC was not asserting jurisdiction over foreign carriers
or foreign telecommunications in violation of the Communications Act.'0
Rather, the FCC was asserting jurisdiction only over the settlement rates
that U.S. carriers must pay their foreign corespondents for termination of
U.S.-originated traffic. While the court was quick to point out that both it
and the FCC were engaging in legal hair-splitting-that is, "that regulating
what domestic carriers may pay and regulating what foreign carriers may
6. Id. at *8.
7. Id. at *4, *11, *13.
8. Id. at*1.
9. SBC Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Hawaiian
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that it was "all too embar-
rassingly apparent that the Commission has been thinking about competition, not in terms
primarily as to its benefit to the public, but specifically with the objective of equalizing
competition among competitors")); see also Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 665 F.2d
1112, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
10. Cable & Wireless, 1999 WL 7824, at *4.
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charge appear to be opposite sides of the same coin""-the court reasoned
that:
by focusing only on the Order's effects on foreign carriers, petitioners
overlook the crucial economic reality that makes the Commission's
position that it is only regulating domestic carriers reasonable: Because
domestic carriers operate in a competitive market, they face a serious
dilemma when they bargain with monopolist foreign carriers. As a
group, U.S. carriers would be best off if each decided not to accept
settlement rates higher than FCC benchmarks. But if one U.S. carrier
maintained this position to the point of impasse in negotiations with a
foreign carrier, a competing U.S. carrier would make the foreign car-
rier a higher offer.12
The preceding analysis raises two significant concerns. First, the lan-
guage cited above indicates that the court either did not understand accu-
rately (or petitioners' counsel did not explain sufficiently), the basic facts
of the case. For example, the court assumes that the United States is the
only country in the world with a significant outpayment deficit. Contrary
to popular belief, however, this assumption simply is not true. Indeed, this
"victim" mentality is a bit disingenuous considering the facts that, for ex-
ample, Japan-based carriers have large deficits with Taiwan, the Philip-
pines, South Korea, Singapore, and other major Asian countries. Similarly,
France Telecom has large outflows to Africa, the Middle East, and even
Latin America. Moreover, the same holds true for British Telecom, Deut-
sche Telekom, Telecom Italia, and other large overseas telephone compa-
nies. I' Similarly, the court again appears to assume that the United States is
the only "competitive" market. Again, this is not so. Numerous other
countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Sweden, and Den-
mark would probably both beg to differ and take great umbrage with the
court's blanket conclusion. Moreover, if the court wants to make blanket
conclusions, then it should look at the local termination markets in the
United States, which, unfortunately, are still characterized by dominant
providers and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. I"
11. Id. at *5.
12. Id.
13. See International Communications Survey Memorandum Re: Addressing the
"Accounting Rates Challenge", TELECOMM. POL'Y REv., Jan. 5, 1997.
14. See, e.g., George S. Ford, Opportunities for Local Exchange Competition Are
Greatly Exaggerated, ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER, Apr. 1998, at 20-21; see also Reconcen-
tration of Telecommunications Markets After the 1996 Act. Implications for Long-Term
Market Performance (Second Edition), PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER SERIES, Policy Pa-
per No. 2, at 36 (July 1998) (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http:l/www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/
pcpp2.doc> (noting that Ray Smith, Chairman of Bell Atlantic, proclaimed proudly on
CNN the very night the FCC approved the merger between Bell Atlantic and NYNEX that
the merged company "accounts for 50 percent of all the European international traffic"
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The second concern is perhaps more egregious: The court's language
cited above blatantly condones and indeed encourages the FCC's efforts to
help U.S. firms engage in a group boycott against foreign firms. Clearly,
this stretches any reasonable interpretation of either the Noerr-Pennington
or State Action doctrines.15
Moreover, if the court applies its factual assumptions to its reasoning,
then the court actually concedes its point that U.S. firms are always at the
mercy of foreign monopolists. Quite to the contrary, given the huge
amount of revenue U.S. traffic represents, when U.S. firms act as a cartel,
they actually have significant monopsony power--or more accurately,
bargaining power-with foreign firms and should be (and are) able to ex-
ercise this power to their advantage. If readers recall from the original arti-
cle, this is precisely what happened in the "Telintar Trade War.
16
The court next reasoned that even if the FCC was taking jurisdiction
over foreign entities, this action was essentially benign because the FCC
lacked an effective enforcement mechanism. Indeed, reasoned the court,
Far from threatening foreign carriers with enforcement actions, the
Order at most states that the FCC will contact "responsible [foreign]
government authorities" to "seek their support in lowering settlement
rates." Given the structure of the global telecommunications industry
and its resulting incentives, we find reasonable the Commission's view
that the Order regulates domestic carriers, not foreign carriers.
17
As explained in more detail in the original article, however, the lack
of an effective enforcement mechanism is one of the primary problems
with the FCC's policies, primarily because a U.S. carrier is hardly going to
ask the FCC to declare its own rates unlawful if a foreign carrier refuses to
negotiate a settlement rate at or below the FCC's benchmarks within the
exact time specified by the FCC." Indeed, the whole reason why the inter-
national telecommunications community entered into treaties such as the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in the first instance was to
mitigate the risk that traffic would be interrupted if the "negotiations" ref-
erenced by the court prove unsuccessful. As such, by flagrantly violating
originating and terminating in the United States); The Busiest Bell, Bus. WK., Jan. 11,
1999, at 80 (naming Ed Whitacre of SBC among its top-10 executives of the year, citing
Whitacre's SBC-Ameritech deal, which, once the deal closes, "Whitacre will head a tele-
com giant with some 57 million local phone lines-almost a third of all phone lines in the
country." (emphasis added). According to the article, "It's all part of Whitacre's plan to take
on AT&T and MCI Worldcom. 'We can sit here and get picked on,' he says, 'or get bigger
and have more clout."').
15. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
16. See Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 164.
17. Cable & Wireless, 1999 WL 7824, at *5 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
18. Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 184-87, 207-13.
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its international commitments,19 the only thing the FCC's mercantile rheto-
ric will achieve will be to create (if not exacerbate an existing) substantial
disincentive for both foreign governments and carriers to engage in good
faith negotiations with U.S. carriers to enter their home markets (which,
paradoxically, is supposed to be the whole goal of such an approach in the
first place). As such, both U.S. consumers and business should really not
be surprised when the economic costs of neo-mercantilism outweigh the
20
very economic benefits the FCC promised that they would receive.
Finally, the court gave the "so what" defense to the FCC's actions. In
the court's own words, while the "practical effect" of the FCC's Order will
be to reduce settlement rates charged by foreign carriers, "the Commission
does not exceed its authority simply because a regulatory action has extrater-
ritorial consequences.' Thus, reasoned the court, the FCC's actions in the
Benchmarks Order are identical to the situations where "the Environmental
Protection Agency regulates the automobile industry when it requires states
and localities to comply with national ambient air quality standards, or
[when] the Department of Commerce regulates foreign manufacturers when
it collects tariffs on foreign-made goods." 22
Sadly, this analogy simply is not accurate-rather, it is inapposite.
First, a trade tariff is nothing more than a naked barrier to entry, usually im-
posed by xenophobic and protectionist policymakers to insulate American
firms from (and thus deny American consumers the benefits of) the lower
prices and additional choices resulting from cheaper goods produced off-
. 23
shore (hence the derogatory term for this conduct-dumping). Because
lower prices and more choices are supposed to be good for consumers, how-
ever, such mercantile actions are anticompetitive and harm consumer wel-
fare.24 Similarly, the FCC's actions in the Benchmarks Order are not akin to
19. See infra Part ll.B.2.
20. See, e.g., Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 137-51.
21. Cable & Wireless, 1999 WL 7824, at *6 (citations omitted).
22. Id.
23. See Paul Magnusson, Getting a Grip on Trade Sanctions, Bus. WK., Nov. 17,
1997, at 115. Magnusson reports that "[iln the past four years, President Clinton has signed
62 laws and executive actions targeting 35 countries." Id. These numbers account "for more
than half the sanctions imposed [by the United States] in the past 80 years." Id. (emphasis
added). Moreover, Magnusson reported that "the direct cost to U.S. exporters in lost sales in
1995 alone was as high as $20 billion[, a]n estimated 250,000 [U.S.] jobs also disappeared,
and no one can measure the damage to relations with angry allies." Id. (emphasis added).
24. See Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions in a Sea of Ana-
lytical Rhetoric, ANTITRUST REP., Dec. 1997, passim [hereinafter Spiwak, The Search for
Meaningful Definitions]; see also James C. Miller, I, Reindustrialization Through the
Free Market, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 121 (1984). Miller argues that when government takes "an
activist," collaborative approach to work with industry in order to promote "competition," it
is virtually impossible to avoid the inevitable conclusion that the outcome of such policies
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imposing national environmental standards because while the U.S. Constitu-
tion clearly provides the U.S. government with preemption authority over
states and localities for such environmental issues,2 as explained in more
detail infra, the U.S. government does not have the right under either express
international treaty or the legal concept of comity to trump another co-
26
sovereign entity by unilaterally prescribing international settlement rates.
In contrast, the FCC's Benchmarks policy is a situation where the U.S.
international telecommunications cartel essentially petitioned the U.S. gov-
ernment to reduce a common input, even when the Commission's own Inter-
national Settlements Policy (with its proportionate return requirements
eliminating the possibility of whipsaw effects) is expressly designed to keep
the cartel "fat and happy" and deter foreign entry-a point that the C&W
court seems to ignore deliberately.27 Accordingly, contrary to the court's
analogy, the instant situation is more akin to the hypothetical situation where
the U.S. shippers pressure the U.S. Maritime Commission to formulate a
single universal fee (based on their internal proprietary data provided by the
largest U.S. carrier), and then have the U.S. government "force" them to only
pay that universal fee whenever U.S.-flagged ships seek to enter foreign
ports-regardless of the underlying cost structure of the individual harbors.
2. Tariff Components Price Methodology
The court also upheld the FCC's use of the tariff components price
methodology (TCP). In doing so, the C&W court specifically rejected pe-
titioners' arguments that "the TCP methodology fails to produce cost-based
settlement rates because it does not use data on the actual cost of foreign
"could do anything but restrict output, raise prices and retard innovation." Id. at 125. Be-
cause such an approach ignores "the distinct interests of over 200 million American con-
sumers in lower prices and higher product quality," most consumers should "start counting
their silverware." Id. at 124-25. As such, argues Miller, "Why kick Santa Claus in the fact?
If other countries foolishly subsidize U.S. consumers.., why should we object? It could
only be a distortion of our economy if they had any chance to achieve monopoly power to
recoup the subsidies we would now be enjoying." Id. at 126 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
25. See, e.g., California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., No. 97-826 et al., 1999 WL 24568, at *8 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1999) The Court upheld
the FCC's jurisdiction to prescribe rate methodology for states, finding that
[t]he FCC's prescription, through rulemaking, of a requisite pricing methodology
no more prevents the States from establishing rates than do the statutory "Pricing
standards" set forth in § 252(d). It is the States that will apply those standards and
implement that methodology, determining the concrete result in particular cir-
cumstances. That is enough to constitute the establishment of rates.
Id.
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
27. See Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 148; but cf Cable & Wireless, 1999 WL 7824,
at *1.
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termination services, petitioners claim that the calculated rates undercom-
pensate foreign carriers. 2 ' According to the court, the record overwhelm-
ingly indicated that "the Commission meticulously documented and care-
fully considered a wide range of public comments concerning the TCP
methodology" and, moreover, that the "final Order contains several passages
explaining why the method more than fully compensates foreign carriers. ' 9
What particularly troubled the court, however, is the fact that, in the
court's view, "Throughout the rulemaking process ... petitioners [that is,
foreign carriers] withheld the very cost data that would have enabled the
Commission to establish precise, cost-based rates" despite "repeated[]" in-
vitations from the FCC "to suggest alternative methods for calculating set-
tlement rates., 30 Thus, reasoned the court,
Since petitioners refused to let the Commission see their cost data, and
since the Commission thoroughly explained why "the TCP methodol-
ogy provides a reasonable basis for establishing settlement rate
benchmarks in the absence of carrier-specific cost data," we have no
firm basis for accepting 3petitioners' claim that the benchmark rates are
not fully compensatory.
Similarly, the court rejected the notion that the FCC used nonrecord
data-in particular, U.S. outgoing call distribution data provided by AT&T
on a confidential basis to calculate country-by-country prices for national
extension services (one of the three TCP components)-even though: (1)
this data was made available for inspection for only a two-week period; (2)
the FCC refused to lengthen the comment period on the grounds that the
data was concise and easy to understand; and (3) that at least one party
submitted comments criticizing the Commission's reliance on the data.
32
According to the court:
foreign carriers had in their hands all the incoming call distribution
data they needed to contest the accuracy of the Commission's calcu-
lated price for national extension services. In other words, even if the
Commission's handling of the AT&T data was less than ideal, it did
not impair the ability of foreign carriers to challenge the national ex-
tension component of the benchmark rates.
So what really happened here? Not to anyone's surprise, the FCC
cleverly and expectedly took jurisdiction over just U.S. carriers (despite its
"extraterritorial" effects), and the court upheld the FCC's actions. As dis-
cussed in greater detail infra (and as history is replete with examples of),
28. Cable & Wireless, 1999 WL 7824, at *9.
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id. at *10.
31. Id. (citations omitted).
32. Id. at*11.
33. Id.
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however, just because the FCC can regulate something does not necessar-
ily mean that it is actually a good idea. Yet, looking beyond this question
for the moment, the C&W decision raises two significant questions that
have yet to be answered.
First, accepting the court's logic for the moment arguendo, it is un-
clear how foreign firms were ever to escape the FCC's jurisdictional
"Catch-22"-that is, the Benchmarks Order states (and C&W upholds)
that if foreign carriers fail to come forward with proprietary evidence
about their costs, then the FCC can assume those costs for them (even
though it admittedly does not know what those costs are). Yet, if the for-
eign carriers decide to come forward to produce their costs (which, under
the clear language of the FCC's invitation they did not have to do because
this proceeding only applied to U.S. carriers), then by doing so they would
effectively waive their jurisdiction in the first instance.
Second, even though the court correctly stated that the FCC may pre-
scribe a ratemaking methodology 34 and chastised foreign carriers for fail-
ing to produce country-specific data, the court fails to answer why it is also
acceptable to use average costs based on teledensity. It is black-letter law
that administrative agencies must account for different market conditions
when analyzing rates,35 and teledensity-which measures only the amount
of telephone penetration-cannot by definition reveal what the underlying
costs are for serving individual countries. Thus, as explained in the origi-
nal article:
the FCC's "one-size"--or, more accurately "five-sizes"-"fits all" ap-
proach to ratemaking is specious at best. The costs of wiring Uzbeki-
stan are simply not the same as the costs of wiring Uruguay, and,
moreover, if either Uzbekistan or Uruguay fail to meet the FCC's
benchmarks, the costs of wiring either country are still not the same as
the (U.S.) $0.08 the FCC thinks is the cost of wiring Sweden.36
More important, however, is the fact that the court failed to recognize
that the use of teledensity actually harms-rather than promotes-
consumer welfare (albeit the consumers of developing countries). That is
to say, under the FCC's Benchmarks Order, the FCC requires countries to
negotiate lower settlement rates over a five-year period of time, depending
on teledensity-the lower the teledensity, the longer a foreign firm may
charge higher settlement rates. Accordingly, rather than appropriately en-
couraging infrastructure development in those very countries that need it
the most, the FCC's Benchmarks Order instead provides Post, Telegraph
34. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 97-826 et al., 1999 WL 24568, at*7 (U.S.
Jan. 25, 1999).
35. See, e.g., City of Batavia v. FERC, 672 F.2d 64, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
36. Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 210.
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and Telephone Administrations from developing countries with the per-
verse incentive to delay-rather than accelerate-new infrastructure de-
velopment in order to maximize revenues.
3. The Evisceration of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine
Finally, the court held that the FCC's actions were appropriate and
did not violate the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. As explained in great detail in
the original article, under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the Commission has
the power to prescribe a change in contract rates when it finds them to be
unlawful and "to modify other provisions of private contracts when neces-
sary to serve the public interest., 37 As the exegesis of the law further ex-
plained, however, this discretion is not unfettered. Under the D.C. Circuit's
landmark decision in Papago Tribal Authority v. FERC, the court holds
that Mobile-Sierra's "public interest standard is practically insurmount-
able., 38 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit specifically held in Western Union-the
very case the D.C. Circuit relies upon in C&W-that regulators have an
exceptionally high burden of proof to show why a contractual term is not
in the public interest, and for that specific reason held that the FCC was
not justified in abrogating the settlement agreement, which established
compromise rates for leasing special access facilities and set specific pro-
cedures for changing those rates in the future. Yet, nowhere in the C&W
court's opinion is either Papago mentioned specifically or Western Union
cited accurately. Instead, stretching Chevron's mandate that courts must
give administrative agencies great deference (in this case, upholding ex-
pressly the FCC's role of cartel manager), the court upheld the FCC's ac-
tions with limited discussion.40
Accordingly, by eviscerating the law, the D.C. Circuit now essen-
tially has given every regulatory agency carte blanche to abrogate a con-
tract that it believes subjectively to be against the "public interest." The
"public interest" is not an arbitrary standard that regulators may use to
promote political pet projects, however. Quite to the contrary, as now-
37. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1495, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
38. See, e.g., Papago Tribal Authority v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
but cf. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 691 (1st Cir. 1995) ("We do not
think that Papago, read in context, means that the 'public interest' standard is practically
insurmountable in all circumstances. It all depends on whose ox is gored and how the pub-
lic interest is affected.").
39. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co., 815 F.2d at 1501-02.
40. Indeed, the court curiously focused primarily on counsel's argument that Mobile-
Sierra somehow was contingent on the underlying transaction of the contract rate in ques-
tion, rather than attempting to determine whether the FCC had presented sufficient justifi-
cation to escape Papago's "practically insurmountable" test.
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Justice Breyer wrote in his landmark decision, economic regulation-just
like antitrust law enforcement-should fulfill identical public policy goals:
"low and economically efficient prices, innovation, and efficient produc-
tion methods.' Stated more colloquially: "[E]conomic regulation is sup-
posed to be a substitute for, and not a complement of, competitive rivalry.
It is not, contrary to popular belief, 'because we can."'
42
Like it or not (and perhaps without realizing it), moreover, the court's
decision on this issue will have lasting and far-reaching implications be-
yond the boundaries of this case because the Mobile-Sierra doctrine ap-
plies to a wide variety of circumstances beyond just settlement rates. For
example, this case will impact significantly how the FCC resolves issues
• 41
of reciprocal compensation. More importantly, however, this case will
have significant implications for the U.S. electric utility and natural gas
industries (the industries from which the Mobile-Sierra doctrine arose), for
this case will now give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) even greater license to abrogate contracts to implement its flawed
restructuring paradigms. 44
41. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990); accord
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("'[T]he basic goal of direct gov-
ernmental regulation through administrative bodies and the goal of indirect governmental
regulation in the form of antitrust law is the same-to achieve the most efficient allocation
of resources possible."' (quoting Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 953, 959
(D.C. Cir. 1968)).
42. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 24, at 8.
43. See, e.g., Remarks of William E. Kennard, Chairman of the FCC, to the National
Association of Regulatory Commissioners, Orlando, Florida, Nov. 11, 1998 [As Prepared
for Delivery] (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http:lwww.fcc.gov/SpeecheslKennardlspwek
833.html>.
I know that a large number of states have already weighed in on the issue of
reciprocal compensation between local carriers handling Internet traffic. I believe
that those states have been right to decide that issue when it has been presented to
them and I do not believe it is the role of the FCC to interfere with those state de-
cisions in any way.
Parties should be held to the terms of their agreements, and if a state has de-
cided that a reciprocal compensation agreement provides for the payment of com-
pensation for Internet-bound traffic, then that agreement and that decision by the
state must be honored.
Now the debate over reciprocal compensation of course raises the issue of ju-
risdiction. I fully respect the interests of state and local government and its regu-
lators to protect the state's vital interests and consumers. At the same time, in this
global economy, vital national interests are also at stake. We must not allow our
mutual legitimate interests be used to divide us as we pursue our mutual and con-
sistent goals.
Id.
44. See, e.g., FERC Merger Analysis Post-Order No. 888: Where Do We Go from
Here?, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER SEmES, Policy Paper No. 3, at 13-14 (Aug. 1998)
(visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.phoenix-center.org/wps.html>.
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B. How Politics Now Trumps Law, Economics, and Facts
As highlighted above, much of the C&W court's reasoning was justi-
fied by inferring an "America-first" rationale (e.g., only the United States
has outpayment deficit; only the U.S. market is competitive; the FCC
needs to protect U.S. competitors, not competition; U.S. firms need to en-
gage in joint boycotts against foreign firms, etc.) In this section, however,
one can see how the court justified its actions with "explicit" mercantile
arguments.
1. Evisceration of the Price Squeeze Doctrine
The first example of "explicit" mercantilism can be found in the
C&W court's discussion of potential price squeeze behavior. In the C&W
decision, the court reasons that the FCC's Benchmark Condition is neces-
sary because
foreign carriers with U.S. affiliates can use their monopoly power to
distort competition in the United States. This occurs when a foreign
carrier and its U.S. affiliate act together as an integrated firm, com-
peting in the U.S. market as a provider of international long-distance
services while serving as a monopoly supplier of a necessary input,
i.e., termination services in the foreign country. By extracting above-
cost settlement rates from U.S. carriers, the foreign carrier enables its
U.S. affiliate to undercut its competitors, since the above-cost portion
of the settlement rate is essentially an internal transfer for the foreign-
affiliated U.S. carrier; for other competitors, it represents a real cost.
Economically, this "price squeeze" behavior has the same effect as if
the foreign carrier engaged in price discrimination by charging its U.S.
affiliate a lower settlement rate than it charged all other U.S. carriers.
45
Moreover, the court went on to reason that even though the FCC
originally believed that its "Effective Competitive Opportunities" test
would be sufficient to "reduce the monopolist leverage essential for price
squeeze behavior," by 1997,
45. Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, No. 97-1612 et al., 1999 WL 7824, at *2 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 12, 1999) (emphasis added). For example, the court found that in the case of Hong
Kong:
The Commission's Order assigns Hong Kong's international carrier, HKTI, a set-
tlement rate of $0.15 per minute-a rate which, according to petitioners, cannot
possibly compensate HKTI for the $0.29 per minute government-mandated
charge that it must pay Hong Kong's local carrier for terminating each incoming
international call. But, according to the intervenors on behalf of the FCC, HKTI is
a wholly owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Telecom, and Hong Kong Telecom
owns Hong Kong Telephone Company, the monopoly provider of local service in
Hong Kong. The $0.29 per minute charge is therefore simply a "left pocket-right
pocket" transaction between two subsidiaries of the same company. Asked about
this at oral argument, petitioners had no response.
Id. at *10 (citation omitted).
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at least two things had changed. First, because the United States had
committed to allowing foreign competitors freer entry into the U.S.
market pursuant to the World Trade Organization Basic Telecom
Agreement of February 1997, the Commission had proposed elimi-
nating the effective competitive opportunities test. Second, despite the
Commission's expectation that increased global competition would
drive rates toward cost-based levels, "settlement rates remain[ed] far
above cost-based levels." In light of these changed conditions, we
think the Commission reasonably adopted its current section 214
authorization policy to deal with the heightened risk of price squeeze
behavior.46
There are several major problems with the D.C. Circuit's analysis from
both an antitrust and factual perspective, however.
As explained in the original article, the primary problem with the
FCC's price squeeze analysis is that it ignores the very bedrock of price
squeeze law (both regulatory cases and cases brought under section 2 of
the Sherman Act)-that is, that the alleged squeeze must be capable of
producing a tangible antitrust injury.47 As further shown in the previous
article, under the current and emerging structure of international telecom-
munications markets, any attempt at a price squeeze is unlikely to succeed
48for U.S.-originated traffic.
Indeed, if the court thought about it for a moment, not only is it
highly unlikely that any foreign firm is actually going to harm competition
by being able to drive out a U.S. firm and then recouping super-
competitive prices via a "price squeeze," but if U.S. consumers start to
switch over to the supposedly "cheaper" foreign supplier-subsidized os-
tensibly by those above-cost settlement rate outpayments-then U.S. firms
would a fortiori lose traffic, and the subsidies to foreign firms would
therefore concurrently decline, thus preventing foreign firms from offering
service at cheaper rates. As such, the whole notion is a self-defeating exer-
cise. As explained in the original article, if the FCC wants to mitigate
strategic vertical conduct by a foreign firm, the key is to get standard inter-
connection rates at the terminating end-the key objective of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) but inapposite to the FCC's mercantile policy
of mandating entry by U.S. firms.49
46. Id. at *12 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
47. See, e.g., Cities of Anaheim v. FERC, 941 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Town of
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990); Boroughs of Ellwood City v.
FERC, 731 F.2d 959, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It is primarily the effects of the price squeeze
and its prospective remedy that should guide the Commission's exercise of discretion...
."); City of Batavia v. FERC, 672 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
48. Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 205-07.
49. Id. at 176-77.
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The court, however, had no real understanding (nor apparently did
counsel for the petitioners again succeed in educating the court) of these
facts. By affirming the FCC's flawed analysis, therefore, the D.C. Circuit
has changed price squeeze law to mean that plaintiffs need not show anti-
trust injury to prevail; rather, they need only show that the defendant had
"evil" in his heart and that there was some ephemeral "very high risk to
competition."50
There are other significant factual errors in the D.C. Circuit's price
squeeze analysis as well. For example, the court essentially affirms the
FCC's erroneous assumption that settlement rates suddenly will become
more "affordable" if they are priced in line with "true costs." As explained
in the first article, however:
Foreign carriers and regulators (i.e., parties reaping the benefits from
the above-cost settlement rates) are unsurprisingly reluctant to reduce
settlement rates. Yet, even though economic theory indicates that
prices are related to cost, for U.S. carriers the settlement rate does not
measure the settlement cost of providing a minute of IMTS service.
With multiple carriers and proportionate returns, the cost relevant to
the setting of prices is not only a function of the settlement rate but of
the input-output ratio (the ratio of inbound to outbound IMTS traffic)
and the carrier's market share. Only for a monopolist is the settlement
rate equal to the marginal settlement cost of the carrier. Given the ab-
sence of monopoly in the United States, therefore, there is no reason to
expect that the IMTS 5 rices of U.S. carriers should be directly related
to the settlement rate.
As such, both the court's and the FCC's notion of "perfect competition" is
just "a Shangri-La up to which no real-world market can measure. 2
Tragically, the factual errors do not end there. For example, the court
also assumes that-even in the post-WTO world-(l) every country aside
from the United States is characterized by a monopoly provider (which is
simply not true); and (2) even assuming arguendo point (1), it is impossi-
ble for regulators to formulate adequate safeguards to mitigate transfer-
pricing abuses with a dominant incumbent. Yet, as the court itself admits,
50. Id. at 205-07.
51. Id. at203.
52. STEPHEN MARTIN, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS: EcONoMIc ANALYsIs AND PUBLIC
POLIcY 16 (1988); Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 24, at 10-11
("[B]ecause telecommunications ... [is] characterized by high fixed and sunk costs, mar-
ginal cost pricing (the raison d'9tre of perfect competition) makes 'perfect competition'
impossible to achieve."); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 97-826 et al., 1999
WL 24568, at *10 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1999) ("In a world of perfect competition, in which all car-
riers are providing their service at marginal cost, the Commission's total equating of in-
creased cost (or decreased quality) with 'necessity' and 'impairment' might be reasonable;
but it has not established the existence of such an ideal world.").
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if things are actually getting better as a direct result of the WTO and other
international liberalization efforts, and as the FCC's own admission that
"increased global competition would drive rates towards cost-based lev-
els,"'53 then why is more regulation needed to deal with a "heightened risk
of price squeeze behavior"? 54
On the other hand, however, assuming arguendo that the court's fac-
tual assertions are correct, then afortiori the FCC should also be incapable
of formulating an adequate methodology to protect firms from transfer-
pricing abuses from America's very own dominant suppliers of local ac-
cess-the regional Bell operating companies-from successfully engaging
in price squeeze behavior. This is not so. In the FCC's Access Charge Re-
form Order, the FCC found specifically that "although an incumbent
LEC's control of exchange and exchange access facilities may give it the
incentive and ability to engage in a price squeeze,"55 the FCC's regulatory
safeguards, coupled with the structural conditions of the market, make a
successful price squeeze unlikely to occur.56 Moreover, when this Order
was challenged in court, the Eighth Circuit held specifically that the FCC's
access charges (the domestic version of settlement rates) imposed on long-
distance providers that include LECs' universal service costs are not
"above-cost" "since universal service contributions are a real cost of doing
busincss.,17 Accordingly, if international settlement rates are-as the D.C.
53. Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, No. 97-1612 et al., 1999 WL 7824, at *12 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 12, 1999).
54. Id. Sadly, this illogical "things-are-better-so-we-need-more-regulation" attitude was
also the centerpiece of the FCC's adjudication of the since-aborted BT/MCI merger. See
Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 216-27.
55. See Access Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange
Carriers; Transport Rate Structure and Pricing End User Common Line Charges, First Re-
port and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, para. 278, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (1997).
56. Id. paras. 275-82. As the FCC explained, a price squeeze is possible in the domestic
context if the incumbent LEC could
rais[e] the price of interstate access services to all interexchange carriers, which
would cause competing in-region carriers to either raise their retail rates to main-
tain their profit margins or to attempt to maintain their market share by not raising
their prices to reflect the increase in access charges, thereby reducing their profit
margins. If the competing in-region, interexchange providers raised their prices to
recover the increased access charges, the incumbent LEC's interexchange affiliate
could seek to expand its market share by not matching the price increase. The in-
cumbent LEC affiliate could also set its in-region, interexchange prices at or be-
low its access prices. Its competitors would then be faced with the choice of low-
ering their retail rates for interexchange services, thereby reducing their profit
margins, or maintaining their retail rates at the higher price and risk losing market
share.
Id. para. 277.
57. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 554 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Circuit posits-"real costs,"' s then if the logic of the Eighth Circuit is fol-
lowed, current settlement rates are similarly not "above-cost," since inter-
national settlement rates are also simply "a real cost of doing business."
59
It follows, therefore, that the letter "D" in "domestic" should not also stand
for "different."
2. Evisceration of International Law
According to the C&W court, the FCC's Benchmarks Order does not
violate the International Telecommunication Union's 1998 Melbourne
Treaty (ITU Treaty), which sets the ITU's International Telecommunica-
tion Regulations (ITR).60 In the court's opinion:
Although the treaty provides that carriers "shall by mutual agreement
establish and revise accounting rates to be applied between them,"...
a separate provision "recognize[s] the right of any member, subject to
national law ... to require that administrations and private operating
agencies, which operate in its territory and provide an international
telecommunication service to the public, be authorized by that mem-
ber.
61
Moreover, the court agreed with the FCC that "the right to authorize a car-
rier to provide service in a given country necessarily includes the right to
attach reasonable conditions to such authorization to safeguard the public
interest" finding that the ITU Treaty's preamble "makes clear that 'it is the
sovereign right of each country to regulate its telecommunications.'
62
Sadly, the court in C&W-once again-is wrong. First, the court
(like most American regulators) has blatantly misread and misconstrued
the ITU Treaty. As mentioned supra, the court upheld the FCC's actions
on the ground that the ITU Treaty's preamble states that "'it is the sover-
eign right of each country to regulate its telecommunications.' 63 This is
58. Cable & Wireless, 1999 WL 7824, at *10. Of course, the great unanswered ques-
tion is from which economics hombook did these courts derive the definition of "real
costs."
59. Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 203-04.
60. The International Telecommunication Regulations (Melbourne, 1988) were ratified
by the United States on December 23, 1992, and became effective on April 6, 1993, the
date of deposit with the ITU. International Telecommunication Regulations, Dec. 9, 1988,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-13 (1991). Together with the Radio Regulations, they compose
the "administrative regulations" of the ITU, some version of which is binding on all ITU
Members (see, e.g., Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication
Union, Dec. 22, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-34, art. 4 (1996)). Compared with the Ra-
dio Regulations (now a four-volume set), the ITR are brief-12 pages of text supplemented
by eight pages of integrated annexes. They are to the wireline world roughly what the Radio
Regulations are to the radio world.
61. Cable & Wireless, 1999 WL 7824, at *6 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 51
Number 2] SURVEY OF FCC INTERNATIONAL POLICY
not true. Had the court taken the time to read the actual language of the
preamble, it would have found that there is no such absolute right because
the words "it is" do not even appear. Rather, the preamble provides the ex-
act opposite:
While the sovereign right of each country to regulate its telecommuni-
cations is fully recognized, the provisions of the present Regulations
supplement the International Telecommunication Convention, with a
view to attaining the purposes of the International Telecommunication
Union in promoting the development of telecommunication services
and their most efficient operation while harmonizing the development
of facilities for worldwide telecommunications.
64
In other words, by signing the ITU Treaty (a.k.a. a "contract" among
sovereign nations), member states agreed to waive-and not to reserve-
some of their sovereign rights in the telecommunications arena in order to
fulfill the broader goals of the ITU. Thus, taking the court's gross misin-
terpretation of the preamble that parties agreed to reserve, rather than
waive, their sovereign rights, there would be no need for a treaty and no
need for a dispute settlement agreement since no party to the treaty could
ever be wrong or in violation of the treaty-it would simply be exercising
its sovereign rights.
Second, even assuming arguendo the court read and interpreted the
Melbourne Treaty correctly, the court once again ignores the facts. As
demonstrated passim, the United States is not the only country with a net
settlement outpayment deficit. If the court's logic is followed to its
(il)logical conclusion, therefore, and if those countries that also have sub-
stantial settlement outpayments deficits enact similar measures, then these
countries' actions would also be perfectly acceptable and legal, despite the
FCC's inevitable argument that such action would be nothing more than an
anticompetitive effort to codify above-cost subsidies to foreign monopo-
lists. Thus, to avoid this inevitable conflict, the ITR regime deliberately
envisions and requires (yet the FCC and C&W court consistently ignore)
that there be "mutual agreement" on a route-by-route and service basis
(rather than unilateral action based on country groupings). This is espe-
cially important given the fact that while there is often general agreement
that settlement rates should be "cost based," there often remains the ques-
tion as to what costs should be included or how those costs should be cal-
culated.
That is to say, section 6.2.1 of the ITR provides that: "For each appli-
cable service in a given relation, administrations [or recognized private
64. International Telecommunication Regulations, Dec. 9, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No.
102-13, preamble (1991) (emphasis added).
65. Id. art. 6.2.1.
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operating agency(ies)] shall by mutual agreement establish and revise ac-
counting rates to be applied between them, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Appendix 1 .... ,66 As discussed above and in the original article,
the FCC's actions have clearly ignored this requirement. Similarly, these
same "administrations or recognized private operating agency(ies)" must
also "tak[e] into account relevant CCITT [now TSB] Recommendations
and relevant cost trends." 67 As explained in the main article, however, the
ITU specifically recommended in a new draft Annex to ITU Recommen-
dation D. 140 against adopting the FCC's benchmark regime, finding, inter
alia, that: "The FCC methodology makes no allowance for dependence on
net settlement payments. In almost all cases the average rate of reduction
necessary under the FCC's methodology is steeper than even the worst
case under the Focus Group methodology" and, therefore, in marked con-
trast to the FCC's "exacting" draconian unilateral actions in which rates
are prescribed arbitrarily, the ITU recommended that "[t]he exact form that
a smoother transition path could take is better left to bilateral negotia-
tions."68
Moreover, this issue can be particularly acute in the case of universal
service payments. As explained in the original article, the international
community is already dismayed (including specific statements by the ITU)
over the fact that every time a call is terminated in the United States, a
caller must pay into the FCC's universal service fund.6' As further ex-
plained supra, the Eighth Circuit has held recently that these universal
service charges, when rolled into access charges, are not "above cost" be-
cause they are a "real cost of doing business." Yet, given its actions and
policies to date, it is highly doubtful that the United States would react
positively if, for example, a country hypothetically defined its internal ver-
sion of universal service as "a wireline phone to every family unit with in-
stallation and usage charges not to exceed those in the United States, 90%
funded by international carriers in the settlement-of-account process based
on their volume of calls terminating in U.S. territory," even though such a
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. See Methodological Note on Transition Paths to Cost-Orientation: Revision 1 of
Contribution from the ITU Secretariat, Nov. 9, 1998 (visited Feb. 15, 1999)
<http://www.itu.int/intset/focus/transition-path%20revl.pdf>. Indeed, the significance of
the fact that the ITU-the official telecommunications agency of the United Nations-went
so far as to actually use exclamation points in its critique (i.e., a diplomatic communique) of
the FCC's actions cannot be discounted. (As a measure of comparison, even U.N. Security
Council resolutions condemning Saddam Hussein have yet to include any exclamation
points in the text.).
69. Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, at 213-16.
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universal service program would seem to meet all the criteria of the WTO
Reference Paper.
Fourth, the court ignores the fact that the ITU offers several (albeit
70
admittedly underutilized) dispute settlement mechanisms. If the U.S.
government had laid an appropriate predicate, then it would have been an
option open to immediate action.
Finally, the C&W court completely ignores the concept of interna-
tional "comity" and the importance of this concept in American jurispru-
dence. Black's Law Dictionary defines "comity of nations" as: "The rec-
ognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to interna-
tional duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. ' 71 The primary reason to
provide comity is to avoid the pitfalls of mercantilism that Adam Smith
warned about nearly 200 years ago, and, as such, both courts72 and en-
forcement agencies must consider international comity when enforcing the
U.S. antitrust laws and policing other disputes. 3 Like it or not, because
70. The first two paragraphs of Article 56 of the ITU Constitution are quoted below.
The third paragraph deals with a compulsory settlement arrangement (in the form of a pro-
tocol attached to the Constitution) to which the United States is not party.
(1) Members may settle their disputes on questions relating to the interpretation
or application of this Constitution, the Convention or of the Administrative
Regulations by negotiation, through diplomatic channels, or according to proce-
dures established by bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between them for
the settlement of international disputes, or by any other method mutually agreed
upon.
(2) If none of these methods of settlement is adopted, any Member party to a dis-
pute may have recourse to arbitration in accordance with the procedure defined in
the Convention.
Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Dec. 22,
1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-34, art. 56 (1996); see also id. art. 41.
71. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
72. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976).
73. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRusT ENFORCEMENT GUIDELNES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995) where both the DOJ and the FTC must, "in determining
whether to assert jurisdiction to investigate or bring an action, or to seek particular remedies
in a given case ... take into account whether significant interests of any foreign sovereign
would be affected." Id. § 3.2; see also id. § 3.2 n.73 (noting that both the DOJ and the FTC
have agreed to consider the legitimate interests of other nations in accordance with the rec-
ommendations of the OECD and various other bilateral agreements).
Specifically, section 3.2 requires that:
In performing a comity analysis, the [DOJ and the FTC must] take into ac-
count all relevant factors, [including inter alia:] (1) the relative significance to the
alleged violation of conduct within the United States, as compared to conduct
abroad; (2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers, markets, or ex-
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there exists for international telecommunications services an international
legal regime that describes the rights and obligations of countries in terms
of reaching "mutual agreement," there is a significant comity problem in
this case that simply cannot be ignored.74
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The above discussion shows that, tragically, the D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion in C&W has dire implications for the future of telecommunications
law. Just for the sake of argument, however, assume arguendo that the
D.C. Circuit was correct and the FCC's actions are wholly lawful. In this
hypothetical case, was it still the right thing to do? This Addendum sub-
mits that, from a policy perspective, it was not.
First, and perhaps most egregiously, the D.C. Circuit essentially law-
fully codifies the notion that "FCC" should, in fact, stand for "Facilitating
Cartels and Collusion., 75 Indeed, by openly approving the fact that the
whole purpose of the FCC's actions was to "strengthen the bargaining po-
sition of domestic telecommunications companies in negotiations with their
foreign counterparts" and by encouraging and condoning U.S. carriers' ef-
forts to engage in what amounts to a group boycott, the D.C. Circuit has
bastardized the "public interest" standard into a concept that inappropriately
promotes individual competitor interests over competition and American
consumer welfare. 76 To argue that by "protecting competitors we a fortiori
protect competition" just does not pass the economic giggle test.77
porters; (4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the con-
duct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad; (5) the existence of
reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the action; (6) the
degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic policies; (7)
the extent to which the enforcement activities of another country with respect to
the same persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be af-
fected; and (8) the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. en-
forcement action.
Id. § 3.2. For a full discussion of comity in relation to agency enforcement of antitrust laws,
see Id. § 3.2, at 20-22.
74. Indeed, assuming arguendo there were no international legal regime applicable to
the commodity or service in question, would the United States be affronted if a foreign
government were to act unilaterally so as to limit the ability of U.S.-domiciled entities to
contract freely with their foreign counterparts in the supply and delivery of a necessary
good or service? Would the United States be likely to consult with its allies regarding an
appropriate response if a foreign entity took comparable unilateral action affecting all
OECD countries? All ITU Members? All WTO Members? Obviously, because the answer
to each one of these rhetorical questions is "Yes," there is a comity problem.
75. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 24, at 34 n.73.
76. Id. passim.
77. Id.
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Second, this case (along with other recent U.S. Trade Representative
and FCC actions) sends a clear signal to the international telecommunica-
tions community that the United States now considers the 1997 WTO Febru-
ary Accord essentially to be worthless.78 Indeed, the rest of the WTO's sig-
natories certainly did not agree to commit to an arrangement where the
United States would be "first among equals" and, more insulting, that their
own respective efforts would be discounted by both U.S. regulators and
courts. As such, U.S. firms should not be surprised if they find their interna-
tional counterparts suddenly less cooperative and foreign regulators and
courts suddenly more hostile to their interests.
79
IV. CONCLUSION
Sadly, despite numerous caveats to the contrary, the Clinton Admini-
stration still cannot get the simple concept that Adam Smith explained
over 200 years ago: Mercantilism hurts consumers-and yes, even Ameri-
can consumers. Indeed, it is still unclear what it hopes to achieve in the
long run by burning all of these bridges. Does the Administration really
want U.S. firms to be perceived immediately as the "ugly American" every
time they enter a foreign counterpart's or regulator's office? If so, then
everyone should get out his Nehru jacket and get used to the catcalls of
"Yanqui Go Home" because free trade, competition, and deregulation are
the last things the FCC's international telecommunications policies are
ever going to produce.
78. See, for example, the FCC's recent actions backpedaling against Mexico's admit-
tedly poor WTO offer. See also the plethora of material on the FCC Web page dedicated to
the FCC's International Bureau Actions Concerning Accounting Rates on the U.S./Mexico
Route and Potential Violations Telmex/Sprint Communications' Authorization to Serve
Mexico (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http:/www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Intemational/NewsReleases/
1998/telmex-sprint.html>. If the FCC suddenly realizes this fact and wants to get out of a
bad deal, however, then maybe it should not have accepted such a poor offer in the first in-
stance.
79. See Spiwak, Survey, supra note 1, passim; see also Guy Daniels, Huffing and
Puffing, COMM. INT'L, Oct. 1998, at 8 ("As a possible trade war looms and Uncle Sam
blusters over compatibility issues .... the European Community is holding firm in the face
of determined U.S. efforts to muscle-in on the third generation mobile standards agenda.");
Robert Aamoth, One Law for the Rich, COMM. INT'L, Nov. 1998 ("The U.S. Federal Com-
munications Commission's international settlement rate policies have caused such disquiet
in the global telecomms community that.., several of the world's largest carriers-and
their governments-are prepared to go to law to get things changed.").

